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T he introduction to the previous Labour Law Review, published by AMRC in 2003, stated that ‘labour laws and their capability to protect workers are under threat across the region. 
New forms of work, increased mobility of capital and labour, the rising influence of FDI are all 
changing the terrain upon which labour law functions’.1  Five years have passed since then. Have 
labour laws gotten any more effective during the last five years?
As all contributors of this book would strongly agree, labour laws have become more 
effective mostly in terms of mobilizing labour ‘flexibly’ in correspondence to the need of mobile 
capital, but not as effective in terms of protecting workers’ livelihood in the region (with some 
exceptions). We have been witnessing that more flexible labour arrangements have been invented 
and have allowed, if not encouraged, more and more informal and irregular workers to be 
excluded from protection by labour laws for the last five years. 
In this chapter I try to reflect points made by following country chapters, however with 
some more strategic points highlighted. The first part of this chapter deals with the intrinsic 
contradiction of labour law in which labour features as a commodity to be protected from market 
despotism, but nonetheless a commodity. The second part discusses the relations between formal/
informal labour and labour laws by tracing the historical trajectory of modern labour law and the 
forms of ‘formal labour’ as a reference point for all the discussion about the informalization of 
labour. The third part addresses the uneven development of the informalization of labour in Asia, 
with particular focus on its impact on women workers. The last part of the tries to draw some 
strategic implications of the informalization of labour on the future of the labour movement in 
Asia. 
Intrinsic Contradiction of Labour Law 
Labour activists often believe that labour law is by nature good and is basically ‘for’ workers. 
Many argue that a major obstacle against the realization of the good nature of labour law is its 
implementation. If put this way, labour law becomes an inherently good thing and the problem 
is perhaps either economic, i.e. lack of resource to train and pay labour inspectors or corruption 
that allows local or national governments not to strictly monitor individual capitals to comply 
labour law at the workplaces. This analysis has truth in it as labour laws are the most commonly 
violated laws in Asia, perhaps only second to traffic regulations. However, the nature of labour 
law may not be that simple. It is important to recognize that labour law itself, implemented or not 
implemented, has dual aspects and an inherent contradiction even without corruption or ‘resource’ 
problems. On the one hand it is ‘the’ law which constitutes labour in modern society as a ‘private 
property’ and labour relations as private property relations of buying and selling. Therefore it is 
not simply a bunch of regulations and rules over the workplaces and ‘industrial’ relations, but it is 
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at the core of organizing capitalist society the way it is: commodity-production and consumption 
by workers who sell their labour power to capitalists for money income and purchase products 
made by some other workers in some other places with the money paid for their labouring 
activities. On the other hand, labour law reforms toward more protection and collective labour 
rights of the workers shows the ultimate challenge, often imposed by the workers movement, to 
labour being framed as a pure commodity exchanged through pure market relations. 
There, we are able to see the clearly distinguished two poles of labour law: as a law that 
defines labour as exchangeable and buyable private property just like any other property, on the 
one hand; and on the other hand, labour as a particular quasi-commodity that is attached to 
human body and soul and therefore cannot be completely subjected the rule of the market. The 
pendulum of labour law reform swings in between those two aspects of the law and it reflects 
power relations between labour and capital. Yet even if, after much effort made by labour, increasing 
number of workers came under the protection of labour law, it could only be done by their 
labouring activities becoming increasingly commodified in doing so. This intrinsic contradiction 
of labour law is well reflected in the historical development of labour law. In this, a formal form 
of capitalist labour, finally became established (and survived very briefly as a dominant form of 
capitalist labour) in contrast to informal labour that is our concern in this book.  
Labour Law, Formal and Informal Labour
 If reforms in the last quarter of the 20th century and the early 21st century witnessed 
capital claiming back labour laws as laws making labour into a property for sale, it was the early 
20th century’s labour law reforms, mostly in developed countries, that had made many ‘real’ 
concessions to the working class Needless to say, it was the early labour movement that changed 
the focus of labour law toward more protection for labour, so that labour would not to be treated 
as merely an object for exchange, but as more of a quasi or ‘fictitious’ commodity that cannot be 
entirely subjected to the rule of money and market. The early labour movement did so by turning 
the area of ‘production’ into a frontline of struggle for political, economic and social rights of 
ordinary people. 
Factories became the most important arena of power struggle for labour, political and 
human rights. The labour movement often put the reproduction of capital relations to a halt by 
turning labour relations, which were supposed to be individual economic relations of exchange, 
into collective and political relations, by challenging and testing the existing legal and political 
boundaries and system. During this period, workers saw many illegal activities that could have 
brought the death penalty to those involved become legal rights of workers. 
The natural and technical outlook of capitalist social relations then needed to be compensated 
for by the modern liberal-democratic state, which offered one vote to one person, without regard 
to the property owned by the individual (While this was a gain for citizens who gained the vote, 
it also effectively meant that workers’ only source of revenue, labour power, was recognized as a 
kind of property). Political parties whose strength was based on organized labour soon grasped 
or at least heavily influenced the state through class voting and then the state introduced more 
protective labour legislations for worker-voters. It was this time that ‘modern’ labour laws started 
being shaped. 
With this modern labour legislation and socio-political rights which were enforced by the 
state and treated labour as a ‘commodity’ but not as a ‘pure’ commodity, we saw the emergence 
of ‘formal capitalist labour’, elements of which include regular hours and pay, the provision 
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of a designed workplace, pensions, sick leave and payments, minimum wage, right to join a 
trade union, right to collective bargaining, workers’ councils, tripartite committees, and most 
importantly right to strike. In other words, labour became ‘formal’ with the introduction of 
these legal and institutional protections that were described in labour laws and guaranteed by the 
democratic state. The recognition of workers’ collective rights, especially the right to strike, was 
nothing but the recognition of the stark difference between the ideal free-contractual relations 
between property owners and labour relations in reality. While the rights earned were certainly 
a great achievement of the labour movement as they really improved workers’ livelihood, these 
institutional regulations were, importantly, ultimately backed by the solidarity-based power of 
industrial trade unions. ‘The formal form of labour’ was thus ultimately a result of the power 
of solidarity that involved not only industrial actions but also political and social alliances for 
democratic control over capital.
It might seem as if it was only the working class which had made a great leap forward by 
the mid-20th century. However, this was not the case, insofar as labour remained nonetheless 
a commodity, whether protected or not protected. The irony of this period was that labour was 
increasingly regarded as a ‘fictitious’ commodity with increasing protective legislation, but at the 
same time work was becoming a ‘commodity’ more than ever before as more social services were 
industrializing, livelihood commercializing, and circuit of capital expanding with the economic 
boom. 
Over the first half of the 20th century, capital also made great progress by continually 
introducing organizational and technological innovations thereby subjected labour worldwide to 
a greater degree of the control of capital. Capitalists in advanced economies introduced Taylorist 
labour processes by which workers became deskilled and lost their control over the labour process. 
Subsequently, so-called Fordist production made human labour an appendage to machinery. By 
standardizing and fragmenting the labour process, these innovations enhanced capital’s control 
over the labour process, if not over the society and politics, and promoted geographical movement 
of capital within and beyond borders. Workers might have gained more income and job security 
but not much control over work processes. 
Although factory workers were increasingly becoming appendages to the Fordist labour 
processes, most formal rights of the established unions were respected. Their efforts were more 
firmly materialized later in the welfare state that guaranteed the rights to a certain degree of 
human dignity without regard to one’s economic ability. The labour movement enjoyed its 
heyday with more political, civil and social rights within capitalist social relations. This was the 
social basis of the post-war boom then: a consensus, often disputed but more or less reasonably 
managed, between institutionalized labour (trade unions), capital, and the state, for better 
productivity (from union to capital) and distribution through welfare (from capital and the 
state to workers). While the deal between more social rights for workers and more productivity 
for capital may have been expensive, it soon turned out to be not a bad deal at all for capital. 
Impressed by its own achievement for workers’ rights, the labour movement was increasingly 
limiting its activities to  ‘democratizing and dignifying capitalist social relations’.2 In doing so, 
it reaffirmed that labour was a commodity, however much protection it needed, rather than 
challenging the commodity nature of labour itself. The labour movement which had initially 
manifested the incomplete nature of capitalist social relations began to function as an example of 
the sustainable and democratic nature of the same relations. 
Furthermore, the traditional labour movement, once having achieved a protected and 
secured formal form of capitalist labour in the core industrialized countries through labour 
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legislation, began to concentrate mainly, if not exclusively, on securing industrial workers’ 
interests by regarding only ‘factory labour’ as ‘normal’ capitalist labour. Consequently, labour 
rights never became universal rights but remained rights for some part of the working population 
only. Protection for non-core members of the working class, often mostly women and migrants, 
was either ignored or rendered to the state without social alliances supporting it. These workers 
were permanently kept as ‘to-be-organized’. 
While the union was gate-keeping the interest of industrial workers whose labour rights were 
protected by labour laws, capital was going beyond the factory gates with increasing mobility, 
which was perhaps the best way to get around increasing world-scale competition and expensive 
deals with trade unions in the developed countries. In doing so, individual capitals started 
utilizing more ‘fluid’ forms of labour outside the core industries, effectively isolating protected 
formal labour. This trend accelerated in the late 1970s when the post-World War boom was 
deemed to have reached an end and many individual capitals lost not only the willingness but also 
the capacity to afford the deal between productivity and welfare. 
Informalization did not start with the flexibilization of the core part of traditional industrial 
workers in developed countries - therefore by the time they felt it, it was too late to stop. 
While workers in the core industries were still enjoying much of labour protections, workers in 
services and other peripheral industries had been experiencing employers using indirect forms 
of employment, creating grey areas between employment and self-employment and detouring 
protection of the labour law. More importantly, largely unorganized workers in those sectors 
could not enjoy their rights even if they were ‘legally’ entitled to them as they have no power to 
enforce it. This was all done amid the massive expansion of the (inter)national circuit of capital 
during the post-World War economic boom period, during which almost all aspects of human 
livelihood became commodity-dependent. This brought a lot more population into the expanding 
circuit of capital, working directly or indirectly for the profit-making process. The direct 
consequence of it was that increasing numbers and portions of population came under the control 
of capital not only as manufacturing workers, but also as service providers, emotional labourers, 
and then as mass consumers. At least in developed countries, society itself was already becoming 
a factory where the entire population was subsumed to profit-making and the realizing process 
of capital. With this, the distinction between factories and society or between working and living 
spaces has been destroyed to a critical extent.
Another crucial fact was the informalization of ‘world labour’, i.e. the increasing portion 
of the world population doing capitalist labour without labour protection. This had started 
well before the late 1970s with the more serious industrialization of developing countries where 
‘imported’ labour legislations lacked the most important element in establishing formal labour: 
democratic alliance controlling and challenging capital. In those countries, labour laws and the 
state in general merely had the function, if they had any, of incorporating local labour forces into 
the world of capitalist labour and exposing local labour forces to market despotism often through 
state violence. This was then accelerated by the widening international circuit of capital that led 
to what we called the international division of labour on the basis of which some developing 
countries, such as Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, initiated export-oriented industrialization. 
This was possible based on what we have mentioned above: a fragmented and simplified labour 
process for mass production that could be easily relocated and copied. Now, the more people 
in developing countries were integrated into the domestic and then world market, the faster 
informalization of world labour developed at the global level. An increasing number of workers 
without clear employment relations and/or protection of labour law, entitled or not entitled, 
was undermining the entire basis of formal form of labour and with it the modern ‘labour law’ 
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world-wide even during the heydays of formal labour in the West. What allowed this was indeed 
the disintegrating social alliance for the democratic control over capital: capital expanded but not 
the social alliance and support. Capital became increasingly mobile, internally and externally, but 
the labour movement had become increasingly rigid. When informalization finally appeared 
to be threatening the industrial heartlands, the ‘protected fictitious commodity labour’ already 
accounted for too small a portion of the world labour force relative to that part of which was 
subsumed to the control of capital without any protection.  
Informalization of Labour 
There are many different theories and explanations of the informalization of labour. The 
definition of informal labour in fact varies country to country, union to union, and scholar to 
scholar, as readers will observe in following country studies. The most common one though has 
been the ‘informal sector’ understanding of the issue that focuses labour conditions in particular 
economic sectors that were outside formal regulation and control in developing countries, 
particularly in Africa and Asia, or developing countries in general. Initiated by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), this has been the most commonly used understanding until quite 
recently. The reason why the ILO and its researchers began to look into this matter was that 
the existence of a relatively large population working in unregistered and unregulated economic 
activities was very interesting matter in contrast to the western counterparts where capitalist work 
enjoyed by and large stable, secure, and clear-cut employment relations. The diagnosis for this 
‘interesting’ problem was the problem of underdevelopment. It is important to note that during 
this period enthusiasm about economic development on the basis of the Western model was 
still high and almost all social problems were attributed to the problem of underdevelopment. 
Therefore, the solution for the problems was obviously more economic development, backed 
by the right policy to promote it. Then the formal form of capitalist labour would appear and 
become dominant as it did in the west. However, this understanding soon came under heavy 
criticism for many reasons. Let us mention a few of them here: 
Informal labour was neither temporary in nature, nor a by-product of the lack of 
capitalist development. Rather, the greater the capitalist expansion of the economy, the 
greater the portion of the population that would come to work informally. It was rather 
reflecting a way in which capitalist social relations expanded.
Informality was no longer to be constrained to unfortunate workers in the South, as 
it once seemed, but expanded to the workers in the formally established economies 
in developed and developing countries, often referred as ‘flexible’ labour rather than 
informal labour. It was not an abnormal problem, but has been proven to be rather ‘a 
tendency accentuated by globalization for work and workers to become informalized’ 
and ‘[recognition] that informalization is a critical component in capitalist globalization 
today, particularly but not exclusively in the global south’.3  
Most of all, an ‘imaginary’ boundary between formal and informal sectors on which 
the informal sector argument was based has been increasingly dismantled by the cross-
sectoral penetration and expansion of the informality of labour. 
These undeniable points were recognized later by the ILO, which has changed its focus 
from the informal sector to the ‘informal economy’. The term ‘informal economy’ has come 
to be widely used to encompass the expanding and increasingly diverse group of workers and 
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of the informal labour has been transferred from the nature of enterprises or industries to that of 
employment.5 As the concept focuses on ‘informal employment’, it now incorporates ‘all forms 
of informal employment’, such as ‘employment without secure contracts, workers’ benefits, or 
social protection, both inside and outside informal enterprises’.6  Therefore, informal labour 
came to refer not only to own-account (self-employed) workers, contributing family workers, 
and employees in informal industries and unregistered enterprises, but also to family workers and 
employees in formal enterprises.7 
 
However, again, the informal economy framework cannot fully overcome the shortcomings 
of the informal sector approach, in the sense that informal labour still appears to be a peculiar 
phenomenon in a particular ‘realm of economy’. In other words, despite recognizing informal 
labour an integral part of globalizing capitalist development, ‘informal economy’ theory 
presents informal labour as something that exists outside of ‘normal’ economy. Therefore the 
informalization of labour is described as an ‘object’ rather than a ‘process’.8
Accepting wholesale the concept of ‘separate’ economies, an informal and a formal one, has 
the danger of allowing informal labour to continue being regarded an exceptional misfortune 
of the ‘working poor’ or something related to the workers in backward individual capitals, i.e. 
sweatshops. In doing so, this may blind one to the increasing informal nature in the works of 
formal workers and create an imaginary distinction between formal and informal workers that 
again creates barriers to solidarity between those workers in reality and therefore to united struggle 
to confront informalization. 
The growth of the informal sector is still described merely as a product of poverty as if 
economic development will automatically remove the informal nature of labour in developing 
countries, rather than as a consequence of a particular form of capitalist ‘development’. This 
contains the implication that the existence of the informal sector the informalization of 
employment stem from two different causes.
Rather, however, surviving jobs of the informal sector and the informalization (or 
irregularization) of employment are two different aspects of the same origin: the expansion of 
capital through more fluid forms of capitalist labour that can be treated as any other commodities, 
selling, buying and disposing – this is the nature of the informalization of labour. The common 
nature between those who working at some points of the expanded circuit of capital for the 
creation and realization of profit as manufacturing or agricultural workers, street vendors, 
service workers or tenant farmers is indeed much bigger than the differences between them. The 
informalization of capitalist labour is the way that capital expands in the era of globalization: it 
is not an abnormal or extraordinary phenomenon. Without informalization of capitalist labour, 
capital will not and cannot expand the way it is now. 
Of course, this is not to say that informalization is a natural process. It is a historical product 
created by a particular development of conflict between capital and labour as described above. 
Informalizing labour means effectively marketizing labour relations, and once again challenging 
the once dominant idea that labour is a commodity needing protection. The informalization 
of labour is a realization of the capitalist ideal where labourers, just like any other actors in the 
market, can benefit the best from the market when they exchange their commodities, labour 
power, according to the exchange rate that the market offers without distortion by non-market 
factors such as the state or excessive labour legislations. The expanded circuit of capital is too 
wide and expensive to be institutionally regulated and decently paid, and there are no significant 
social alliances to pursue such regulation. This naturally results in an increasing number of people 
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working under no regulation. 
In spite of the dismal conditions of labour, it is more often than not necessary for workers 
to sell labour power to survive as the entire swathes of human activity in society has been anyway 
commodified and continuously needs money income to sustain lives in it. Capital moves through 
these areas exercising its control yet less agreeable to paying much for them, at least not as willing 
as it was for the workers in core industries during the heyday of the workers movement. In Asia, 
the 1990s has a particular importance in shaping Asian labour because it was through this period 
that capitalist labour finally became the common substance for the survival of Asian population. 
At the same time it was through the accelerated globalization in 1990s when capitalist labour took 
on a particular nature; it had become commonly informal, as particular historical forms, conditions, 
and definitions of ‘labour’ as formal labour have been eroded worldwide. This development has 
been faster in speed, bigger in scale and ‘smoother’ in process in Asian countries where ‘formal’ 
capitalist labour had not yet been firmly established. In this accelerated globalization, capital no 
longer wanted or needed to rely on regular, protected and formal jobs in order to expand. 
Uneven Development of Informalization in Asia and the Gender Question
Development of labour informalization in Asia has been highly uneven and accordingly 
many different forms of informalization exist. Informal capitalist labour broadly includes mainly 
two forms: labour in informal ‘employment’ and un-waged capitalist labour largely in the 
informal sector. Informal forms of employment here refer to the wide range of people whose 
working relation is based on direct and indirect ‘wage relations’. This includes the whole range 
of workers who are not permanent and full-time employees. They can be categorized in many 
different ways and in fact different countries have different systems to distinguish one from 
another informal employment. According to the period of labour contract, there are short-term 
contract workers, which again include many different forms such as seasonal agricultural workers, 
project-based construction workers, and most migrant workers whose work contract is inherently 
short-term in nature. According to the indirect nature of employment, there are dispatched 
workers, in-company subcontract workers, agency workers, home workers, and disguised self-
employed. And according to the forms of labour service provision, there are part-timers, on-call 
workers and so on. One form of informal employment does not exclude others. More often than 
not, different forms of informal employment overlap. For instance, dispatched workers are mostly 
short-term contracted. 
While the forms of informal ‘employment’ just mentioned are those which appear in the 
statistics as irregular employees, the ‘un-waged’ forms of capitalist work get excluded, even 
though, it is a prevalent form of making a living particularly in low income countries, such as 
many forms of self-employment in agricultural, manufacturing and service sector. Often, self-
employed workers are related to employers or corporation service users through commercial not 
wage relations, even if they do work for corporations. Though their relations with employers may 
be vague and untraceable, they are still doing capitalist work because their works provide essential 
services to reproduce capital by reproducing labour power of others, distributing petty products 
among consumers, cleaning the streets, providing cheap meals and transportation to workers, 
etc. Often, they do not own any means of production, nor do they have employees under their 
command. These are the people who constitute most of the urban poor and large scale reserve 
army of labour in developing countries. They are often more vulnerable to market despotism and 
bullying of authorities than informal employees in industrial establishments, lacking any form of 
social security, not to mention union protection.
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As our country studies show, different countries present different dominant forms of 
informal labour according to the pathways and degrees of capitalist development and power 
relations between capital and labour. In low income developing countries in Asia, such as 
Cambodia, India, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan and Viet Nam, the lack of institutional labour 
protection, the immaturity of industrialization, the often forced integration of the population into 
capitalist social relations and the fast expansion of the circuit of capital that quickly commodifies 
people’s livelihood deprive people of the means of production and subsistence, on the one hand, 
and provide no decent jobs, on the other. This creates a particular form of development: an 
increasing informal sector where different survival forms of incoming-earning activities are mixed 
up with traditional self-subsistence and reproductive labour. This has, as Arnold points out in his 
chapter on Cambodia, much to do with ‘disruption in rural-agricultural livelihood’. People in 
rural communities lose their means of production and subsistence in various ways. Occupation 
of land for property development or plantation often deprives small scale cultivators of their 
inherited right to land and forces them to leave their lands. Many of them flow into urban areas 
in search of jobs. Commercialization of agriculture often involves aggressive inroads by big agri-
businesses and forces rural villagers to migrate to cities. Mega-scale development plans of the state 
do the same, as described in the chapter on Laos. 
Apart from rural-urban migration, other factors contribute to the increase of un-waged jobs 
in the informal sector. Many workers once employed in the formal economy and laid off in the 
process of restructuring, for example, become urban dwellers in search for survival jobs and often 
permanently stay in the informal sector. As Van Thu Ha illustrated in the chapter on Viet Nam, 
the privatization of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Viet Nam forced many into the 
informal sector due to different ‘private sector barriers’ against the former SOE workers. One of 
the barriers is ‘age’ as private sector prefers young workers. Similar cases have been reported in 
China as well after the state-engineered mass lay-offs of SOE workers that axed at least 27 million 
workers between 1997 and 2003.9 Older workers and particularly middle-aged women workers 
could not succeed in finding new formal jobs. Daily work experiences in the informal sector in 
fact represent people’s livelihoods in Asia, as the size of population in this condition in the most 
populated countries in Asia well exceeds people in formal employment in Asia. Informal jobs in 
the informal sector accounted for 86 per cent of the total workforce in India between 2004 and 
2006, according to Mansingh (see the chapter on India). More than 70 per cent of Indonesia’s 
workforce is also known to be in the informal sector.10  
Workers in Japan, as well as workers in core manufacturing industries in some high income 
countries in Northeast Asia, were once known for secure jobs, since experiencing a period of 
the formalization of labour with the emerging labour movement and democratization. The 
institutional protection of labour which workers in the core industries had enjoyed later expanded 
to the manufacturing sector in general and solidarity-based protection also appeared by the early 
1990s, in the cases of Korea and Taiwan, and decades earlier in Japan. In these parts of Asia, the 
growing informality of labour largely (though not exclusively) has meant the dissolution of regular 
employment, as we see in the following chapters on Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. An 
increasing number of workers, previously in standard forms of employment with institutional 
protections, have now become disposable as they join the irregular workforce in dispatched, 
contracted and part-time arrangements. Most striking is the collapse of the Japanese employment 
system with emerging informal jobs and in particular the steep increase in the number of part-
timers as described by Sakai and Hiroki. Kim’s chapter describes South Korea’s switch from one 
of the countries with the highest job security during the heydays of the militant trade unions 
to one with the highest level of irregular jobs among the OECD countries after neoliberal 
reforms. It is also a striking example of informalization as South Korea has been known as a 
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good example of new unionism that could survive the fast expansion of capital. With much less 
active and politically divided unions and workers collective rights under threat, as Liu describes, 
Taiwanese workers also have difficult choices between informal jobs or no jobs. This trend of 
formal employment being replaced by informal employment is felt hard even in Hong Kong and 
Macau where the portion of formal and secured jobs was relatively smaller than other Northeast 
Asian countries. In particular, as Wu describes in her chapter on Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s swift 
restructuring of economy from manufacturing to a service and finance-based economy appeared to 
have accelerated the informalization of employment. In cases of Hong Kong and Macau, the fast 
informalization of employment has more to do with weak trade unions and sluggish development 
of collective labour rights during its industrialization. Workers in both Special Administrative 
Regions of China – Hong Kong and Macau - lack the right to collective bargaining although both 
cities have freedom of association that is missing in mainland China. Now with massive outflow 
of capital to China, unions have even more difficulty in upholding labour protection. In Macau, 
as described in detail in Choi’s chapter, continuous inflow of migrant workers from mainland 
China to Macau opens the way to more informalization and puts the weak unions and labour 
activists in a difficult position. 
These different trends can also appear all together in one country. India is a good example of 
this. The core manufacturing sector that developed with protected formal labour on the basis of 
relatively strong union power and protected domestic market now faces increasingly informalizing 
employment, whereas the vast majority of previously self-subsisting agricultural labour forces 
dwell in the informal sector. By and large the middle income countries in Southeast Asia, such 
as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, share same experiences and problems with 
India, however with unwaged labour of a smaller scale in the informal sector. In these countries, as 
Xavier, Ofreneo, Bundit, Voravith and Suntaree succinctly show, subcontracting and outsourcing 
of works to work units that cannot be monitored and regulated causes a major concern. Home-
based work is a typical case of this. Existing labour laws often do not cover home workers and 
new regulations and protective measures, if any, are highly selective and limited so that workers in 
these particular strata of the supply chain work in risky and often fatal working conditions. In the 
so-called least developed countries, the informalization of labour can be accompanied ironically 
with more formalization of economy as the chapter on Laos presents. Countries like Mongolia 
share the same experience. This means that more of the population previously engaged in self-
subsistence economic activities move to formalized work arrangements in more formal industries 
often as waged workers. However, this does not mean that their labour relations will be formal 
in the sense they are regulated, protected and unionized. It is very unlikely that newcomers from 
largely agricultural self-subsistence or petty market economy to manufacturing industries or 
other urban industries through the formalization of economy will have ‘formal’ jobs. Therefore, 
workers in these countries are not free from the worldwide informalization process. Cambodia’s 
experience is perhaps a good illustration of this. Cambodia is also experiencing the formalization 
of economy with an increasing number of wage workers, which however goes together with 
the informalization of labour. According to Arnold’s chapter on Cambodia, even jobs in the 
garment sector which had been the driving force of Cambodia’s development and created most of 
Cambodia’s foreign currency earnings are being informalized to a significant extent.  
Perhaps the most important uneven development of informalization appears along the line 
of gendered division of labour. As many contributors to this book have clearly pointed out, 
informalization is not a gender-neutral process but a highly gendered process. Women’s work 
tends to take more informal forms than men’s work and women tend to be the majority both 
among the informal sector workers and informal employees. With no exception among Asian 
countries, developed, developing or least developed, women workers are being targeted for the 
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replacement of permanent full-timers with workers in non-fixed form of employment while 
women’s survival forms of service provision are usually more mixed up with traditional household 
or communal labour in domestic and other non-industrial spaces. The informalization of women’
s work is pre-contextualized in gendered-class hierarchy (or often classed-gender hierarchy). The 
prevalence of women in informalizing employment and non-waged capitalist labour force is 
precisely because women’s work has been traditionally counted as ‘informal’ in capitalist society. 
The reason why women’s work is considered ‘informal’ is again because women’s work at 
home is regarded as not ‘immediately’ creating capitalist value, a belief shared even by many 
radicals and reformists. Women’s work at home is recognized not as producing ‘value’ or profits 
but only creating ‘use value’ at home. Therefore, women’s work is regarded as perhaps important 
but not as valuable as men’s work. This widespread and deeply rooted idea of women’s work 
as ‘secondary’ imposes disadvantages to women at work. Women’s integration into the labour 
market for ‘real jobs’ gave many women opportunities for economic independence but was also 
used by capital to create a massive reserve army of labour that could guarantee a cheaper supply of 
labour to capital. By and large, jobs given to women were largely humble unskilled jobs and this 
tendency still remains strong with only a few exceptions. The more serious integration of women 
into the labour market was then a product of the process in which many essential domestic 
works done by women at home and communities got commodified and the service provision in 
domestic and communal spaces became a domain of business for capital. Many women became 
employees in these ‘women’ sectors but the gendered connotations of these women’s services 
remained intact and therefore wages in these sectors remain cheap. 
The gendered division also affects those who do the same jobs as men do in the formal labour 
market, often reflected in slower promotion for women. There is also a strong tendency to sack 
women workers during recession and re-employthem during a boom—largely treating women as 
surplus labour. In this sense, the ‘secondary’ nature of women’s work is therefore inscribed from 
the very beginning of capitalist development, rather than new to the informalization of labour. 
However, this ideology of women being secondary labour force has been fully utilized in 
informalization process as our country studies show. Although informalization is an overarching 
development across the region, it is true that informalization attacks women workers first and 
more effectively. One of the most common rationales given by employers and governments is 
that women are more suitable for flexible arrangements for work and they themselves prefer 
those arrangements. Indeed, our country studies show that in many cases women workers prefer 
flexible arrangements. In particular, home-based work often makes a good example of informal 
jobs offering ‘opportunities’ to women who cannot work full-time away from home. However 
most women ‘have to’ prefer these forms of work arrangement. It is the combination of women’
s unshared obligation for work at home, which many men and women believe ‘natural’, and the 
informalizing labour market, that makes informal work appears to be women’s own choice. The 
real reason for women to ‘choose’ these jobs is the lack of decent jobs with a social system for 
child care, the unshared burden of domestic work, and excessively long working hours with too 
little wage for the male counterparts, rather than women workers’  ‘natural preference’.  
Furthermore, the labour movement has not done much to prevent women workers from 
being informalized. The labour movement, both radical and reformist, has not counted the 
exploitation of women at home seriously, nor that of women at work. However, women’s labour 
has been absolutely essential in the (re)production of capitalist social relations and therefore it is 
not possible, contrary to the typical argument that resolving class contradiction would remove 
gender inequality, to address the exploitation of capitalist labour without addressing women’s 
exploitation both at work and home. 
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Organizing women workers has long been regarded as a secondary, and women’s work 
at home and work regarded as lower priority, by many trade unions; but as many feminist 
activists and academics have found, the exploitation of women’s work at home and work is an 
essential part of the exploitation of capitalist labour. Women’s unpaid and unwaged domestic 
and emotional labour is indeed an important root origin of the value exploited from labourers 
by capital. Profit comes not only from the non-paid work of male workers (as in the traditional 
radical argument) but also from the unpaid labour of women that reproduces labour power 
commodity at home. So the concept of exploitation has to always integrate the unpaid women’
s work. More importantly, it is urgent for the labour movement to recognize that the entire class 
exploitation has been built upon the specific mediation of women’s exploitation and patriarchy 
is an important and essential basis of capitalism. One of them cannot be overcome without 
overcoming the other together. It is precisely because of this that the problems women are facing 
in informalization of labour cannot be regarded as women’s problems only but as the problems of 
all. 
Reclaiming or Reforming Labour Law
In most of the Asian countries we have studied, we find that labour law is indeed a 
contesting ground for capital and labour struggling for a better economic and political position in 
the continual reformulation of conditions for development. Labour law reforms gearing toward 
more flexibility and informality in most of the Asian countries manifest the power relations 
between labour and capital after the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98. Organized labour has 
been losing ground, if not been made irrelevant, whereas capital has taken full advantage of 
the crisis to reformulate the basis of capital accumulation nationally, regionally and globally. 
Neither the recovery from the economic crisis nor formal democratization following the crisis 
has accommodated further political mobilization of the working class or improved labour 
protection. However, as we see also in our country studies, struggles to create a new paradigm 
of labour protection have already begun. They have begun with women workers organizing in 
India, informal workers building alliances in Korea and Cambodia, regular workers campaigning 
for informal workers’ rights, home workers networking throughout Southeast Asia and, most of 
all, the increasing number of informal workers who are realizing that they are the ones who can 
change the conditions that make their livelihood intolerable and our society unsustainable. 
Then, where are these struggles leading us to? While there is a consensus that informal 
workers should be organized to gain more protections and social rights, there are various 
approaches to the matter of informalizing labour. Our particular concern in this book is indeed 
about our strategy regarding the use of labour law. Where does labour law fit into these struggles 
for better livelihood of informal labourers? Can a better labour law be achieved, and if achieved, 
can its implementation stop the gendered informalization of labour in Asia? Few reader of this 
book would argue against the idea that we need to reclaim those labour laws that have been 
‘reformed’ toward labour informality in favour of capital and against the interest of the working 
class. However there may be different ways to reclaim labour laws in the interest of the working 
class. One way is perhaps to go back to where we were before the informalization of labour, 
in other words, re-formalizing labour. In this strategy, labour law is indeed at the centre of 
discussion. This strategy involves 1) expanding protective labour laws to cover not only existing 
formal form of labour but also informal form of labour, on the one hand, and 2) restricting the 
use of informal labour, on the other. The other possible strategy to reclaim labour laws on behalf 
of labour is rather more fundamental in the change it seeks, as it involves ‘reinventing labour law’ 
to be a law that allows democratic control and allocation of social labour, rather than a law that 
constitutes labour as a commodity to be exchanged through the market.
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The former strategy, i.e. restoring ‘formalization’ may look quite familiar; it is precisely 
because we have, or, to be more correct, the labour movement in the West has, been there. This 
strategy believes in putting things back into place, i.e. re-formalizing labour is the solution. 
For this ‘global reformalization’ strategy, it is necessary to rebuild the social setting of state-
based labour regulation and protection. For them the combination of the state, labour law, and 
formal labour is presented as the ultimate form of democratic control and there is no intrinsic 
problem with it. In this sense, this argument is in line with that of ILO and perhaps, that of the 
US President-elect Barack Obama – the market and democracy as two wings of modern society. 
The only problem is that they somehow lost the social alliances and solidarity upon which the 
combination relied for being relevant. Informalization is problematic because labour law cannot 
protect those workers at the edge of the legal boundaries of the old labour law. Things will get 
better by ‘recovering’ the particular social settings in which protective laws could be powerful 
and the state could implement the law. What concerns them then is the fact that particular 
commodity was not protected enough.
 
However, there are serious problems with this strategy in spite of the immediate feasibility 
and therefore persuasiveness of it. Firstly, this strategy does not seriously address the reason why 
the seemingly perfect combination broke down in the first place. The given answer to the question 
is rather too simple: too much market and too little state. Actually the power of social alliances 
started declining as soon as organized labour tried to ‘democratize’ capitalist social relations with 
clearly self-imposed limits, within which labour could be exchanged as commodity, nonetheless 
protected commodity. Labour became a ‘protected’ commodity, but only at the expense of being 
more like a commodity in nature (just like one can be ‘respected’ slave only by becoming a better 
slave). This is what I named the intrinsic contradiction of labour law. As mentioned above, 
labour law only covers labour insofar as it is sellable and buyable.  As long as labour remains as a 
commodity, labour only has two choices, to be protected or not protected. Reforming labour laws 
can make this particular commodity more protected but cannot challenge the commodity nature 
of labour. The solution based on labour law reform is therefore a solution within the inherent 
contradiction of labour law. 
Furthermore, it may no longer be possible to recycle this strategy even within the inherent 
contradiction of labour law because it relies on the social form of labour that existed about a half 
century ago. The combination of the state, labour law and formal labour might have been suitable 
strategy for the industrial form of social labour. A particular form of democratic control over 
capital developed on the basis of it. However, as the social form of labour evolved, the feasibility 
of the same strategy is at best highly questionable. The very combination of the state, labour law 
and formal labour that developed was a strategy pursued on the basis of the industrial form of 
social labour that was the contemporary form of labour at that time—not designed on the basis of 
any previous social form of labour, such as indentured labour or slavery. A new strategy is required 
for the present era of informalization. Furthermore, having seen the recent development of so-
called representative democracy in developed countries, it is also doubtful that the combination of 
the state, labour law, and formal labour is the ultimate form of democratic control over capital. 
Perhaps then it is time for us to reclaim labour law differently. This does not mean relying 
on labour law to get things right or relying on the state to do the job. Rather this means we 
reclaim the underlying spirit of the struggles for conditions that would not treat human labour as 
commodity. This means that we widen the scope of labour rights and once again, just as the earlier 
labour movement did, test the legal boundaries, establish a new paradigm of labour regulation 
and protection that goes beyond the existing legal boundary of employment and the state power, 
as imaginatively as the earlier labour movement went beyond the poor law with labour laws. In 
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so doing we can invent an alternative labour regulation based on a different form of democratic 
control of capital. In this case, reclaiming labour law is to go beyond the inherent contradiction 
of labour law. We need a lot more than the existing labour law. That is to say, challenging current 
power relations between labour and capital is to be prior to legal reform. The former works for the 
latter, not the other way around. 
It is important for us to notice that workers in informalizing labour relations have indeed 
employers even if it does not seem so. The employer is the society itself that is subsumed to 
the process of making and realizing profit for capital. The labour movement needs to be the 
movement of socialized labour that organizes all those who are working for capitalist (re)production 
within the extended circuit of capital with or without institutional protection and rights. In 
doing so, the labour movement perhaps needs to be almost completely reformed according to 
the changing form of labour to effectively challenge the power relations. Even the old concept 
of democratic/independent unionism that was used to define a ‘real’ union needs to be changed. 
There are many ‘democratic’ and ‘independent’ trade unions that do nothing for workers 
outside their territories and constituencies. The vast majority of informal workers are excluded 
‘democratically’. In many cases unions appear to be just and only as democratic as the state whose 
dictators are elected by universal suffrage. Almost all strategies, developed, written, and formalized 
in text books and manuals of the labour movement are rarely useful as much as the protective 
clauses in the labour law are now. The question is whether we are ready to change everything we 
have or not. 
Conclusion 
The problem created by informalization is more about the effectiveness of ‘labour law in 
general’ as a traditional means of enhancing labour standards, rather than the ‘quality’ of different 
Labour Acts in different countries. The problem lies with the fact that protective elements of 
labour laws have become more and more powerless. The reason why existing labour law is not 
effective is that capital has left, or rather was allowed to supercede, the limited time-space dimension 
that was the basis of modern labour law and formal labour. It is a consequence of the declining 
effectiveness of the particular form of democratic control, based on social solidarity which had the 
power of endorsing the state. That is why all the efforts to lobby parliaments to make ‘labour law’ 
better to ‘protect’ labour, without changing the existing system of politics and building wider 
democratic alliances, have only limited impact even at their maximum. Indeed, all that matter is 
not the law itself but the power relations between labour and capital behind the law, the relations 
that appear to be legal relations in the law. 
The meaninglessness of law is indeed one of the most common experiences of the working 
people today when they try to claim their entitled rights. Then why do we need to study labour 
law after all? We believe it is important to know labour law not simply because it is ‘the’ tool 
to protect us from increasing attack on the labour movement and security of livelihood (not 
job security) but because knowing labour law is a prerequisite to overcoming the intrinsic 
contradiction of labour law, and to overcoming the social power that is reflected in it in general. 
Amid the currently deepening world-scale crisis of capitalist development, the labour 
movement once again faces great challenge: whether or not the crisis is to be overcome at the 
expense of workers, particularly of the most vulnerable part of the working class including 
informal, migrant and women workers.  It is in this context that our study would like to enlighten 
some strategic points and, in so doing, to assist labour activists across the region to develop a 
strategic approach to future ‘labour reform’. 
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